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1The Effects of Short-Term Liabilities on Profitability:
The Case of Germany
Abstract
Using data from Germany this paper examines the direct eﬀect of non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms’ use of short-term versus long-term liabilities. We develop a structural model
of a ﬁrm’s value maximization problem that predicts that proﬁtability of the ﬁrm
will change if ﬁrms alter their use of short-term versus long-term liabilities. We
ﬁnd that ﬁrms that rely more heavily on short-term liabilities are likely to be more
proﬁtable.
Keywords: proﬁtability, short-term liabilities, maturity structure, capital struc-
ture.
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21 Introduction
The importance of the determinants of corporate capital structure is well recognized in
the ﬁnance and economics literature. Numerous papers investigate not only the non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrm’s choice of leverage but also the maturity structure of debt (Guedes and
Opler (1996), Ozkan (2002)). Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1999) investigate the eﬀects
of ﬁrms’ debt maturity structure on proﬁtability for Italy and the United Kingdom. They
ﬁnd a positive relationship between initial debt maturity and medium term performance.
However, much less attention has been directed to the relationship between the maturity
structure of ﬁrms’ liabilities and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm performance.
Barclay and Smith (1995) deﬁne three nonmutually exclusive hypotheses to explain
ﬁrms’ choice of a debt maturity structure: the contracting-cost hypothesis, the signalling
hypothesis, and the tax hypothesis. The contracting-cost hypothesis considers the cor-
poration’s future capital investment as a real option. In a seminal paper Myers (1977)
suggests that ﬁrms that employ shorter-maturity debt are likely to have more growth
options in their investment opportunities. Debt that matures before execution of in-
vestment options cannot lead to suboptimal investment decisions. There could also be
a conﬂict between stockholders and bondholders that might lead to an underinvestment
problem if long-term debt is issued.1
The signalling hypothesis views issuance of short-term debt as a positive signal of
the ﬁrm’s low credit risk. Diamond (1991) ﬁnds that the ﬁrms with the highest credit
rankings prefer to issue short-term debt because of small reﬁnancing risks: the ability
to avoid a “crisis at maturity.” Long-term debt is more eﬃcient at limiting managerial
discretion (Hart and Moore (1998)), and Stohs and Mauer (1996) suggest that larger,
less risky ﬁrms usually make greater use of long-term debt.
Finally, the tax hypothesis analyzes the tax implications of the debt maturity choice.
For example, Brick and Ravid (1985) ﬁnds that the ﬁrms employ more long-term debt
when the term structure has a positive slope.
1Managers acting on behalf of their stockholders might reject projects with positive net present
values because risky debt absorbs a portion of stockholders’ beneﬁts.
3These hypotheses explain ﬁrms’ preferences for certain tenors of debt. On the supply
side of the market for loanable funds, short-term debt in an environment of incomplete
contracts grants the lender a control right since the ﬁrm’s ability to roll over the debt
may be conditioned on ﬁnancial ratios and adequate performance. As this mechanism
limits managerial discretion it may contribute to the relaxation of ﬁnancial constraints
(Rajan and Winton (1995)). We model ﬁrms as price takers in the market for loanable
funds, facing a schedule of interest rates on short- and long-term debt. The ﬁnancial
constraints they face are represented by the prices charged for loanable funds.
In a broader setting, ﬁrms make use of many types of liabilities, both short-term
and long-term, beyond those strictly classiﬁed as debt. In reality, many smaller, less
liquid ﬁrms ﬁrms do not enjoy access to debt markets, but nevertheless can acquire
external funds through bank lending, loans from associated ﬁrms, trade credit, and
other means. In structuring their liabilities, ﬁrms’ managers must choose their associated
maturity, taking into account many of the same issues and constraints that aﬀect the
choice of a debt maturity structure. In this paper, we broaden the perspective from
the existing literature on debt maturity structure to consider ﬁrms’ choice of liability
maturity structure. We then consider how these choices inﬂuence the proﬁtability of
German ﬁrms. Because we consider a broader set of liabilities than traded debt, we
may conduct the analysis on a much broader set of ﬁrms than those with privileged
access to the capital markets (e.g., see Audretsch and Elston (2002) and Rajan and
Zingales (1995)). Since the term structure of interest rates is generally upward-sloping
with maturity, longer maturity liabilities usually bear higher interest rates but could be
preferable if the ﬁrm may face diﬃculties in frequently reﬁnancing short-term obligations
and bearing the associated ﬂotation costs (with respect to debt issuance, see Berger,
Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005), Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2005)).
We formulate a dynamic stochastic partial equilibrium model of a representative
ﬁrm’s value optimization problem. The model is based upon an empirically testable
hypothesis regarding the association between the form of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ liability
structure and their proﬁtability. To test the model’s predictions, we apply the System
4GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) to a panel of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms obtained
from the annual Bundesbank balance sheet database over the 1988–2000 period. After
screening procedures our data include more than 18,000 ﬁrm-year observations.
The impact of uncertainty may diﬀer across categories of ﬁrms. Consequently, we
also consider four sample splits. Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. We
ﬁnd evidence of a positive association between the ratio of short-term liabilities to total
liabilities and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ proﬁtability as measured by return on assets (ROA).
Results obtained from sample splits conﬁrm ﬁndings from earlier research that ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics are important determinants of corporate performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic stochas-
tic model of ﬁrm’s value maximization. Section 3 presents the data and estimation
techniques and discusses our empirical results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
The theoretical model proposed in this paper is based on the ﬁrm value optimization
problem and represents a generalization of the standard Q models of investment by
Hubbard and Kashyap (1992). The present value of the ﬁrm is equated to the expected
discounted stream of Dt, dividends paid to shareholders, where β is the discount factor.
In the analytical model, we consider a single type of liability: debt, which may be issued











Kt = (1 − δ)Kt−1 + It, (2)
Dt = Π(Kt−1) − C(It,Kt−1) − It + Bt − Bt−1R(Bt−1,Kt−1)
+Lt − Lt−2R(Lt−2,Kt−2), (3)


















LT = 0,∀t (6)
The ﬁrm maximizes equation (1) subject to three constraints. The ﬁrst is the capital
stock accounting identity Kt = (1 − δ)Kt−1 + It where Kt−1 is the beginning-of-period
capital stock, It is investment expenditures, and δ is the rate of capital depreciation. The
second constraint deﬁnes ﬁrm dividends, where Π(Kt−1) denotes the maximized value of
current proﬁts taking as given the beginning-of-period capital stock. C(It,Kt−1) is the
real cost of adjusting It units of capital.
Two types of external ﬁnancing are available. The short-term debt Bt must be repaid
next period. The price of external ﬁnancing is equal to the gross interest rate, R(Bt,Kt)
which depends on ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics such as the current level of debt and the
capital stock available as collateral. Similar to Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), we
also assume RB(Bt,Kt) > 0: i.e., highly indebted ﬁrms must pay an additional pre-
mium to compensate debt-holders for additional costs because of monitoring or hazard
problems. Moreover, RK(Bt,Kt) < 0: i.e., better-collateralized ﬁrms enjoy a lower risk
premium. Alternatively, the ﬁrm could use long-term ﬁnancing, Lt, which must be re-
paid two periods hence. As in the case of short-term debt, we assume RL(Lt,Kt) > 0
and RK(Lt,Kt) < 0.
At time t, all present values are known with certainty while all future variables are
stochastic. In order to isolate the role of debt ﬁnancing we assume that equity ﬁnancing
is too expensive and ﬁrms only employ debt ﬁnancing. Furthermore, managers are
assumed to have rational expectations.
Financial frictions are introduced through the non-negativity constraint for divi-
dends, Dt ≥ 0 and the corresponding Lagrange multiplier λt which can be interpreted as
the shadow cost of internally generated funds. Equations (5) and (6) are the transver-
sality conditions which prevent the ﬁrm from borrowing an inﬁnite amount and paying
it out as dividends.
Solving the optimization problem we derive the following Euler equation for invest-
6ment:2
CI(It,Kt−1) + 1 = (7)










(1+λt) , respectively. Expressions βΘt and β2Ψt may serve as stochastic time-
varying discount factors equal to β and β2, respectively, in the absence of ﬁnancial
constraints (λt+1 = λt+1 = λt).
From the ﬁrst-order conditions for short- and long-term debt we derive




2Ψt [R(Lt,Kt) + LtRL(Lt,Kt)]
i
= 1 (9)
Equations 8 and 9 have a strong analogy in consumption theory (Whited (1992)).
Under the assumption of perfect capital markets the price of each tenor of debt must
equal the inverse discount factor: R(Bt,Kt) = 1/β and R(Lt,Kt) = 1/β2.









[CI(It,Kt−1) + 1] −
(1 − δ)E [Θt(CI(It+1,Kt) + 1)]
EΘt
+ BtRB(Bt,Kt)
Expected proﬁtability is inversely related to the shadow prices of short-term debt, Θt,
and long-term debt, Ψt.














2For simplicity, we ignore the derivative of the investment adjustment cost function with respect to
the capital stock, CK,t. In our data the mean of It






. Therefore, its eﬀect is negligible.
7For reasons of convenience we deﬁne debt gross interest rates as a linear function of debt
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It is immediately clear that the sign of this derivative is positive if 2RK(Lt,Kt)/βRL(Lt,Kt) <
1. If the sensitivity of long-term debt with respect to the size of the ﬁrm is high, then
issuing short-term debt will be a more proﬁtable strategy. Schiantarelli and Sembenelli
(1999) suggest that the issuance of short-term debt reduces the probability that a ﬁrm
will miss proﬁtable investment opportunities. Hence, greater reliance on short-term debt
and the resulting ﬂexibility in the ﬁrm’s capital structure may be associated with higher
levels of proﬁtability, which provides us with a testable hypothesis.
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Data
The Bundesbank’s balance sheet database of German companies is used to test our
hypothesis regarding ﬁrms’ choice of liability maturity structure.3 The collection of the
data is related to the supervisory status of the Bundesbank, which is legally assigned
to overview the credit standing of all companies conducting rediscount transactions. If
a company is involved in these transactions, it must submit its annual accounts to the
local branches of the Bundesbank in order to prove its solvency.
The database covers on average 70,000 ﬁrms’ annual characteristics from 1988 to
2000. We consider only manufacturing ﬁrms, which are corporations with Tax Balance
Sheet (Steuerbilanz) or Commercial Balance Sheet (Handelsbilanz) types of accounting.4
We utilize data items Net proﬁt (AP189), Total assets (AP088), Cash and equiva-
lents (AP045) and Sales (AP144) to generate measures of proﬁtability (ROA), liquidity
3For a more detailed description of the database see von Kalckreuth (2003), Harhoﬀ and Ramb
(2005) and the references therein.
4We excluded ﬁrms with Opening Balance Sheet (Er¨ oﬀnungsbilanz) or Carcass Balance Sheet
(Rumpfbilanz) since these types of balance sheets do not cover the entire year of the ﬁrm’s activity.
8(Cash/TA) and the sales-to-assets ratio (Sales/TA). The key variable of our research is
the short-term liability ratio (ST/TL) which is deﬁned as a ratio of short-term liabilities
(AP111) to total liabilities (AP111 + AP128).5
We apply several sample selection criteria to the original sample. Observations
with the following characteristics are removed from the sample: (a) negative values
for investment-to-assets ratio; (b) those from ﬁrms that have fewer than ten observa-
tions over the time span; (c) those with values of ratio variables lower than the ﬁrst
percentile or higher than the 99th percentile. We employ the screened data to reduce
the potential impact of outliers upon the parameter estimates.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for Cash/TA, Sales/TA, ST/TL and ROA for
the pooled time-series cross-sectional data. We observe that German companies make
heavy use of short-term liabilities. Their average ratio of short-term liabilities to total
liabilities is 0.70. Their average proﬁtability (ROA) is equal to seven per cent.
The empirical literature investigating ﬁrms’ capital structure behavior has identi-
ﬁed that ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics play an important role.6 We might expect that a
group of ﬁrms with similar characteristics (e.g., those ﬁrms with high levels of liquidity)
might behave similarly, and quite diﬀerently from those with diﬀering characteristics.
Consequently, we split the sample into subsamples of ﬁrms to investigate if the model’s
predictions would receive support in each subsample. We consider four diﬀerent sample
splits in the interest of identifying groups of ﬁrms that may have similar characteristics
relevant to their choice of liability maturity structure. The splits are based on ﬁrm
size, the ratio of short-term liabilities to total assets, the liquidity ratio and the ratio of
short-term bank liabilities to total liabilities.
The sample splits are based on ﬁrms’ average values of the characteristic lying in the
ﬁrst or fourth quartile of the sample. For instance, a ﬁrm with number of employees
above the 75th percentile of the distribution will be classed as large, while a ﬁrm with
number of employees below the 25th percentile will be classed as small. As such, the
classiﬁcations are not mutually exhaustive.
5See also Appendix 1 for data description.
6See Ozkan and Ozkan (2004).
9Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between corporate performance and
debt maturity structure for six of the largest industries: textiles (NACE 17, 28, 19),
wood products (NACE 20, 21, 22), chemical (NACE 23, 24, 25), metallurgy (NACE 27,
28), metal processing (NACE 29, 31, 34) and electronics (NACE 30, 32, 33).7
3.2 Econometric Results
We estimate several sets of regressions, comparing the results with respect to diﬀerent
subsamples. Proﬁtability of total assets is our dependent variable. We lag all explanatory
variables by one year (except proﬁtability). Hence, for ﬁrm i in year t we estimate
equation













+ κt + ωi + νit
Thus, we can now formally state our hypothesis that the liability maturity structure
aﬀects ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. This hypothesis can be tested by investigating the signiﬁcance
of φ5 in equation (13):
H0 : φ5 = 0 (14)
H1 : φ5 6= 0
Estimates of optimal corporate behavior often suﬀer from endogeneity problems, and
the use of instrumental variables may be considered as a possible solution. We estimate
our econometric models using the system dynamic panel data (DPD) estimator. DPD
combines equations in diﬀerences of the variables with equations in levels of the variables.
In this System GMM approach (see Blundell and Bond (1998)), lagged levels are used
as instruments for diﬀerenced equations and lagged diﬀerences are used as instruments
for level equations.
We build a set of instruments including ROAt−2 to ROAt−8, (Cash/TA)t−1 to
(Cash/TA)t−8, (Sales/TA)t−1 to (Sales/TA)t−8 and ST/TLt−1 to ST/TLt−8 for the
7The classiﬁcation is based on Klassiﬁkation der Wirtschaftszweige, Ausgabe 1993 (WZ 93).
10diﬀerence equations and ∆ROAt−2 to ∆ROAt−9, ∆(Cash/TA)t−1 to ∆(Cash/TA)t−8,
∆(Sales/TA)t−1 to ∆(Sales/TA)t−8 and ∆ST/TLt−1 to ∆ST/TLt−8 for the level equa-
tions. The models are estimated using a ﬁrst diﬀerence transformation to remove the
individual ﬁrm eﬀect.
The reliability of our econometric methodology depends crucially on the validity
of instruments. We check it with Sargan’s test of overidentifying restrictions, which
is asymptotically distributed as χ2 in the number of overidentifying restrictions. The
consistency of estimates also depends on the serial correlation in the error terms. We
present test statistics for ﬁrst-order and second-order serial correlation in Tables 2-
4, which lay out our results on the links between corporate performance and liability
maturity structure.
Table 2 displays results of equation (13) for all ﬁrms and two subsamples. An increase
in the reliance on short-term liabilities leads to an increase in ﬁrms’ proﬁtability, with
a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect. Hence, our ﬁndings support the hypothesis that a shorter
tenor of liabilities aﬀects the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability. This ﬁnding is consistent with that of
Agarwal and Elston (2001) who argue that banks’ rent-seeking behavior is responsible
for the dominance of long term-liabilities in German ﬁrms’ balance sheets.
Having established the positive eﬀect of short-term liabilities on return on assets,
we next investigate if the strength of the association varies across groups of ﬁrms with
diﬀering characteristics. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 report results for small and large
ﬁrms. Based on the point estimates, the ﬁnancial performance of smaller ﬁrms is slightly
less sensitive to the changes in liability maturity structure. We ﬁnd a more interesting
contrast in the results for ﬁrms with low and high levels of short-term liabilities relative
to assets, reported in the two last columns. Firms with few short-term ﬁnancial com-
mitments display sensitivity to the liability maturity structure, unlike those with heavy
demands on near-term cash ﬂow. Both types of ﬁrms display signiﬁcant sensitivity to
liquidity, measured by cash holdings.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 3 present results for low-liquidity ﬁrms: those in the
bottom quartile of the distribution of cash-to-assets ratios versus their high-liquidity
11counterparts. The liability maturity structure aﬀects both groups, but the performance
of less-liquid ﬁrms is less sensitive to the changes in the ratio of short-term liabilities
to total liabilities. The last two columns of Table 3 present results for ﬁrms with low
reliance on bank loans versus high reliance on bank loans, respectively. Both types of
ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the liability maturity structure. Not surprisingly, these
eﬀects are considerably stronger for those ﬁrms with less reliance on bank lending.
In Table 4 we investigate the sensitivity of proﬁtability to liability maturity structure
among the six largest industries in the sample. The results indicates that ﬁrms that
belong to metallurgical and chemical industries have higher sensitivity compared to
ﬁrms in the other four industries.
In summary, we ﬁnd strong support for our hypothesis (Equation 14). The prof-
itability of ﬁrms increases when they make greater use of short-term liabilities rather
than long-term liabilities in their capital structure. It could be explained by the fact
that short-term debt aﬀects proﬁtability through better monitoring and control, or by
allowing greater ﬂexibility to exploit investment opportunities.
4 Conclusions
In this study, we investigate the relationship between non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ proﬁtability
and the ratio of short-term liabilities to total liabilities. We hypothesize that ﬁrms’
proﬁtability varies in response to variations in ﬁrms’ liability maturity structure, with
greater reliance on short-term liabilities associated with higher proﬁtability.
We test this hypothesis by employing the Bundesbank’s balance sheet dataset of
German ﬁrms for the 1988–2000 period and ﬁnd strong support for our hypothesis. The
ﬁndings in this study, derived from a broad sample of ﬁrms across the German industrial
sector, shed considerable light on the relation of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ liability maturity
structure and their proﬁtability.
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14Appendix 1: Construction of the ﬁrm speciﬁc measures
The following variables are used in the annual empirical study from the Deutsche
Bundesbank’s balance sheet database:
AP034: Number of employees
AP045: Cash and equivalents
AP088: Total assets
AP097: Liabilities to banks
AP111: Short-term borrowed capital
AP128: Long-term borrowed capital
AP144: Sales revenues
AP189: Net proﬁt
15Table 1: Descriptive statistics and deﬁnitions, 1988–2000
Variable Deﬁnition µ σ N
ROA Net Proﬁt / Total Assets 0.07 0.00 19,207
Cash/TA Cash / Total Assets 0.09 0.01 18,594
Sales/TA Sales / Total Assets 2.30 0.87 18,945
ST/TL Short-Term Liabilities / Total Liabilities 0.70 0.03 19,069
ST/TA Short-Term Liabilities / Total Assets 0.53 0.04 19,052
LT/TA Long-Term Liabilities / Total Assets 0.22 0.02 19,207
(ST + LT)/TA Total Liabilities / Total Assets 0.75 0.03 19,207
Note: N is sample size (ﬁrm-years), µ and σ represent mean and standard deviation respectively.
16Table 2: Sensitivity of ROA to Liability Maturity Structure: All ﬁrms and sample splits
Dependent Variable: ROAt
All Small Large Low High
ST/TA ST/TA
ROAt−1 0.419*** 0.392*** 0.210* 0.166** 0.443***
(0.054) (0.090) (0.115) (0.082) (0.162)
ROAt−2 0.091*** 0.110** 0.143*** 0.171*** 0.103
(0.028) (0.047) (0.055) (0.038) (0.077)
(Cash/TA)t 0.145*** 0.150*** 0.117*** 0.102*** 0.110***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
(Sales/TA)t−1 0.007*** 0.001 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
(ST/TL)t 0.077*** 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.110*** 0.027
(0.006) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
N 14693 3268 3839 3745 3432
Sargan 0.104 0.193 0.163 0.137 0.626
AR(1) -9.29 -5.5 -3.61 -4.74 -3.18
AR(2) .0724 1.08 -1.42 -2.24 -.47
Note: Each equation includes constant, year and industry dummy variables. Asymptotic robust stan-
dard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by two-step System GMM (with Windmeijer-
corrected standard errors) using the xtabond2 package for Stata. Sargan is a Sargan–Hansen test
of overidentifying restrictions (p-value reported). AR(k) is the test for k-th order autocorrelation. *
signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
17Table 3: Sensitivity of ROA to Liability Maturity Structure: Sample splits II
Dependent Variable: ROAt
Low High Low Bank High Bank
Liquidity Liquidity Liabilities Liabilities
ROAt−1 0.332 0.242*** 0.381*** 0.238
(0.202) (0.075) (0.096) (0.154)
ROAt−2 0.081 0.123*** 0.154*** 0.073
(0.081) (0.044) (0.054) (0.066)
(Cash/TA)t 0.211*** 0.140*** 0.126*** 0.150***
(0.051) (0.013) (0.015) (0.024)
(Sales/TA)t−1 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.009**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
(ST/TL)t 0.047*** 0.121*** 0.106*** 0.050***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011)
N 3563 3605 3575 3654
Sargan 0.259 0.331 0.301 0.287
AR(1) -2.30*** -5.21*** -4.87*** -2.73***
AR(2) -1.01 -0.65 0.18 -1.46
Note: Each equation includes constant, year and industry dummy variables. Asymptotic robust stan-
dard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by two-step System GMM (with Windmeijer-
corrected standard errors) using the xtabond2 package for Stata. Sargan is a Sargan–Hansen test
of overidentifying restrictions (p-value reported). AR(k) is the test for k-th order autocorrelation. *
signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
18Table 4: Sensitivity of ROA to Liability Maturity Structure: Industry splits
Dependent Variable: ROAt
Textile Wood Chemical Metallurgy Metal Proc. Electronics
ROAt−1 0.415** 0.341*** 0.166 0.420*** 0.413*** 0.317**
(0.178) (0.123) (0.112) (0.114) (0.106) (0.132)
ROAt−2 0.071 0.101* 0.193*** 0.081 0.087 0.184**
(0.118) (0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.055) (0.077)
(Cash/TA)t 0.114*** 0.165*** 0.168*** 0.154*** 0.130*** 0.198***
(0.032) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.017) (0.034)
(Sales/TA)t−1 0.009 0.010** 0.017** 0.008* 0.008* 0.022***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
(ST/TL)t 0.070*** 0.052*** 0.097*** 0.089*** 0.070*** 0.071***
(0.023) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.026)
N 1078 3069 2280 2076 3559 1261
Sargan 0.309 0.031 0.146 0.798 0.336 0.856
AR(1) -2.96*** -4.00*** -3.05*** -3.97*** -4.97*** -3.24***
AR(2) 0.62 -0.24 -2.75*** -0.39 0.10 -0.17
Note: Each equation includes constant, year and industry dummy variables. Asymptotic robust stan-
dard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by two-step System GMM (with Windmeijer-
corrected standard errors) using the xtabond2 package for Stata. Sargan is a Sargan–Hansen test
of overidentifying restrictions (p-value reported). AR(k) is the test for k-th order autocorrelation. *
signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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